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Abstract—Determining the semantic similarity of functions is
a key task in reverse engineering that heretofore has been hin-
dered by inaccuracy and/or high labor costs. Software Ethology
addresses inaccuracy and analysis cost by abstracting semantic
behavior as classification vectors of program state changes.
Our framework executes functions with a specified input state,
leveraging these vectors as unique fingerprints for semantic iden-
tification. Existing binary analyses determine function similarity
via code measurements, and suffer from high inaccuracy when
classifying functions from compilation environments different
from their training source. Since Software Ethology does not
rely on code measurements, it withstands broad changes in
compiler, compiler version, optimization level, or even different
implementations of equivalent functionality. As a key feature,
classification vectors for one architecture are transferable to other
architectures with minimal effort.
Tinbergen, our prototype Software Ethology implementation,
deploys a fuzzer in a virtual execution environment to generate
the classification vectors. Evaluating Tinbergen as a semantic
function identifier for coreutils-8.32 functions, we achieve
a high .779 average F-Score. Compared to the state-of-the-art
BLEX and IMF-SIM frameworks, Tinbergen is 25%–53% more
accurate when identifying functions in binaries generated from
differing compilation environments. We demonstrate that pro-
gram state changes are versatile semantic identifiers, by achieving
similarly high accuracy rates in purposefully obfuscated code, as
well as when identifying functions in AArch64 binaries using
classification vectors generated from x64 binaries. Finally, we
show that Tinbergen scales to large binaries, by performing
an evaluation on semantic identification accuracy for libxml2,
libpng, and libz, which are among the largest shared libraries
distributed with Ubuntu.
I. INTRODUCTION
Semantic binary analysis — the act of determining a
function’s “purpose” within a binary — has applications in
many research and engineering areas. In software forensics,
identical code across different binaries highlights plagiarism
or copyright violations [1]. Identical semantic code in a
single binary is redundant, and can be removed by software
engineers to limit binary bloat [2]. Determining how a new
malware affects computer systems often starts with reverse
engineering the semantic behavior of (new) functions present
in the binary [3]. Malware authors often make slight changes
from existing malware to create a new strain in an effort to
evade detection, and analysts use semantic similarity (i.e.,
how close in functionality one function is to another) to
deduce lineages in these newly discovered strains [4], [5].
Attackers can find vulnerabilities in closed source software
by performing differential semantic analysis on pre- and post-
patched binaries [6].
As difficult as it is to determine a function’s semantic
behavior from source [7]–[11], it is even more difficult from
a compiled binary [12]. Inferring semantics from code is
challenging as the same source-level semantics can be im-
plemented through vastly different code, and there is no direct
relationship between the two. At the binary level, the analyst
must first determine the set of changes to program state a
function can conduct (e.g., what computations the function
performs, or what memory addresses are accessed). Based on
the program state changes the analyst can then infer semantic
meaning, and eventually build a whole program understanding
from how the semantic pieces fit together. Consequently,
whole-program analysis at the binary level remains a challenge
because manual analysis is time-consuming, and automated
solutions [13]–[17] are inaccurate or incomplete.
Automated binary analysis solutions [18] all measure prop-
erties of binary code (e.g., order and type of instructions [15],
memory locations accessed [13], [19], or control flow [20]),
comparing the behavior of functions based on the similar-
ity of implementation artifacts. These solutions assume that
code similarity approximates function semantic similarity, but
machine code can vary while still preserving semantics. We
demonstrate that program state modifications serve as a better,
more stable semantic function identifier. Program state change
as a function identifier relies on the fact that semantic behavior
is stable across compilations, environments, or implementa-
tions. Thus, program state change provides an ideal fingerprint,
as it is impervious to compilation environment diversity or
information loss. Code measurement approaches, conversely,
are susceptible to at least one of these complicating factors.
In this paper, we present Software Ethology, an approach to
precise binary semantic analysis. Instead of relying on measur-
ing code properties of a function, Software Ethology abstracts
functions into characteristic sets of inputs and corresponding
program state changes. The core idea of Software Ethology is
to observe and identify the behavior or character of functions
instead of the underlying code, and then use the observed
behavior as a unique function identifier. We draw an analogy
between the analysis of function semantics and the biological
concept of ethology (from the Greek ethos and logia, meaning
the study of character). A major topic in ethology is the study
of reliably predictable animal responses to the presence of
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known environmental stimuli. Likewise, semantically similar
functions reliably make predictable changes to program state
for given initial states. Those state changes can be measured
and saved for later use in identifying unknown functions in a
stripped binary, irrespective of the compilation environment.
As a proof of concept for Software Ethology, we imple-
ment Tinbergen1, a dynamic, fuzzer-inspired binary analysis
tool. Tinbergen adapts mutational, coverage-guided fuzzers to
discover a subset of a function’s unique set of inputs and
measurable program state changes (referred to as Input/Out-
put Vectors, or IOVecs). Tinbergen organizes the discovered
IOVecs into a searchable tree, from which unknown functions
can be classified as a previously analyzed function, or as
genuinely unique functionality, which should be the focus of
manual analysis. Additionally, Tinbergen identifies the course-
grained layout of input and global structures used by IOVec
exercised code, including a minimal size and which bytes are
pointers.
We evaluate Tinbergen on accuracy amid varying compi-
lation environments, a task existing works find difficult yet
is crucial for automated reverse engineering. We measure
accuracy by identifying functions in the coreutils-8.32
application suite, and find that Tinbergen achieves a high .779
average accuracy across 8 different compilation environments,
while improving accuracy by 25%–53% over state-of-the-art
for differing compilation environments. Additionally, when
compared with state-of-the-art, Tinbergen is 39.3% more ac-
curate when identifying functions in purposefully obfuscated
binaries. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of IOVecs by
achieving native accuracy when analyzing AArch64 binaries
using unmodified x64 IOVecs.
This paper provides the following contributions:
1) Design of Software Ethology, a framework for semantic
binary analysis that infers function semantics through
program state changes;
2) Tinbergen, a practical implementation of Software
Ethology that leverages coverage-guided, mutational
greybox fuzzing to automatically infer program states
and input structure layouts for functions;
3) We show the effectiveness of Tinbergen through a
thorough evaluation on coreutils-8.32, obfuscated
binaries, and cross-architecture binaries. We further il-
lustrate the effectiveness of Tinbergen by demonstrating
that it scales to three large, ubiquitous shared libraries
in Ubuntu.
II. CHALLENGES AND ASSUMPTIONS
Here, we outline challenges for semantic function identi-
fication, and our assumptions when designing Tinbergen and
Software Ethology.
A. Semantic Function Analysis
Reverse engineering a binary can be a long and difficult
task. The manual process of reverse engineering a binary
1Named for Nikolaas Tinbergen, the founder of biological ethology
starts with extracting and disassembling the binary instruc-
tions, followed by function identification, i.e., determining
the location and size of functions. These tasks can be non-
trivial to perform, but recent work [17], [21]–[25] make them
feasible. Once the function bounds are identified in the code,
the challenging task of semantic identification — determining
what computation or program state change a function performs
— begins. Semantic identification is the hardest, most time-
consuming part of reverse engineering.
The largest impediment to semantically recognizing known
functions is the large code diversity due to different compi-
lation environments. Here, we refer to the compilation envi-
ronment as the exact compiler and linker brand and version,
optimization level, compile- and link-time flags, linker scripts,
underlying source, and libraries used to generate a binary.
Compilers attempt to create efficient, optimized code, and
different compilers utilize different optimization sets. While
compilers preserve the high level semantics expressed at the
source level, the generated binary code is highly variable,
as illustrated in Figure 1. The source (Listing 1) is from
the strlen implementation in the musl C library [26].
Different optimization levels of the same compiler (Listing 2
and Listing 3), different compilers at the same optimization
level (Listing 2 and Listing 4), and different versions of the
same compiler and same optimization level (Listing 2 and List-
ing 5) all produce different code and/or Control-Flow Graphs
(CFGs) from the same underlying source. Optimizations, like
dead code analysis and tail call insertions, also greatly affect
the generated machine code. Even worse, custom function
implementations (as opposed to the use of system-distributed
libraries) will likely produce significantly different binaries.
Compilation environment differences inadvertently conspire
to prevent prior analyses from trivially transferring to new
binaries. This forces the analyst to examine every function
individually, even for functions that were previously analyzed.
Diversity in compilation environments also presents a signif-
icant challenge to automated code-based semantic identifiers.
Static analysis tools, like BinDiff or IDA, are inaccurate
when presented with highly optimized code [13]. State-of-the-
art dynamic analysis tools [13], [15] perform better, but still
struggle with varying environments.
However, regardless of compilation environment, the pro-
gram state changes a function performs must remain stable
for a binary to exhibit correct behavior. Barring any bug in
the compiler implementation or inconsequential actions such
as dead stores, the same source code should produce the same
semantic behavior in the final application. If this was not the
case, binaries would exhibit different, and likely incorrect,
behavior in different builds.
Each function implicitly specifies a unique set of input
states that produce a measurable set of changes in program
state, determining the behavior of the function. Different input
states for the same function can produce different changes in
program state, and different functions may produce different
changes in program state for a single input state. Semantic
identification can therefore be defined as the discovery of a
1 size_t strlen(const char *s)
{
3 const char *a = s;
const size_t *w;
5 for (; (uintptr_t)s % ALIGN; s++) if (!*s) return s-a;
for (w = (const void *)s; !HASZERO(*w); w++);
7 for (s = (const void *)w; *s; s++);
return s-a;
9 }
Listing 1: Source
strlen:
2 movq %rdi, %rax
testb $7, %dil
4 je .LBB0_4
movq %rdi, %rax
6 .p2align 4, 0x90
.LBB0_2:
8 cmpb $0, (%rax)
je .LBB0_8
10 addq $1, %rax
testb $7, %al
Listing 2: clang-4.0 -O3
1 strlen:
pushq %rbp
3 movq %rsp, %rbp
movq %rdi, -16(%rbp)
5 movq -16(%rbp), %rdi
movq %rdi, -24(%rbp)
7 .LBB0_1:
movq -16(%rbp), %rax
9 andq $7, %rax
cmpq $0, %rax
11 je .LBB0_6
Listing 3: clang-4.0 -O0
1 strlen:
testb $7, %dil
3 movq %rdi, %r8
je .L2
5 cmpb $0, (%rdi)
jne .L4
7 jmp .L22
.p2align 4,,10
9 .p2align 3
.L6:
11 cmpb $0, (%rdi)
Listing 4: gcc-7.3.0 -O3
1 strlen:
testb $7, %dil
3 movq %rdi, %rax
je .LBB0_4
5 movq %rdi, %rax
.p2align 4, 0x90
7 .LBB0_2:
cmpb $0, (%rax)
9 je .LBB0_8
incq %rax
11 testb $7, %al
Listing 5: clang-3.9 -O3
Fig. 1: strlen differences under varying compilation environments.
characteristic set of input states and the corresponding external
program state changes the function makes given the input. We
call these inputs and program state changes Input/Output Vec-
tors, or IOVecs. The challenge is to find a sufficiently distinct
set of IOVecs that can uniquely identify a function. However,
once found, this set can be used to identify a function in
another binary regardless of compilation environment. IOVecs
are thus ideal for semantic function identification.
B. Assumptions
In line with existing semantic analysis tools, when designing
Software Ethology, we assumed the following:
1) Binary code is stripped, but not packed.
2) Binary code is generated from a high-level language
with functions, and function boundaries are known.
3) Functions make state changes that are externally visible.
4) The binary follows a discernible and consistent Appli-
cation Boundary Interface (ABI).
5) Functions do not rely on undefined behavior.
When analyzing binaries, reverse engineers start with a
likely stripped binary from which they infer its behavior. The
analysts have no access to the underlying source, debugging
information, symbol table, or any other human-identifiable in-
formation. We assume the same setting for Software Ethology.
Semantic analysis frameworks also make the assumption that
all code is unpacked, and that the binary was generated from a
high-level language with a notion of individual functions and
a known ABI. The latter assumption precludes applications
written wholly in assembly with no discernible functions,
and, while packed code is another serious challenge in binary
analysis [21], [22], [27], that topic is orthogonal to the analysis
that semantic analysis frameworks perform. Finally, as it is
rare in practice and most likely a bug, no code should rely
on undefined behavior to correctly function. The compiler is
free to use undefined behavior for optimization purposes, but
the original source should not rely on any specific compiler-
based optimization utilizing undefined behavior for proper
functionality. Note that functions which rely on randomness
(e.g., cryptographic functions) are still valid; semantic analysis
frameworks simply assume that function semantics do not
change with the compiler.
Calling a function can cause many writes to occur, however,
the writes a function makes cannot only be ephemeral, e.g.,
operating only on local stack frame memory and not returning
a value. This is because once finished, any change would
be overwritten or unused by later instructions, and thus the
program would have been more efficient had it not called the
function at all. Functions that make only ephemeral changes
are dead code, and we assume that the compiler will simply
remove such code from the final binary. Depending on opti-
mization level, some program state operations, e.g., dead stores
which write to addresses but are never read, can be removed
from the final binary. We do not include such operations in the
function’s set of program state changes, but focus on persistent
and externally measurable program state changes. We argue
that most user space functions conform to these standards,
however, we discuss the limitations these standards impose in
§ VII.
III. SOFTWARE ETHOLOGY
Software Ethology is a function semantic identification
framework, which infers program semantics by measuring the
effects of execution. Instead of measuring code properties, it
measures program state changes that result from executing a
function with a specific initial program state.
1 int my_div(int a, int b, int* c)
{ *c = a / b; return 0; }
3
Listing 6: An IOVec Motivating Example.
When a function executes, it does so with registers set to
specific values, and an address space in a particular state, with
virtual addresses mapped or unmapped to the process’ address
space, and mapped addresses holding concrete values. We refer
to the immediate register values and address space state as the
program state. Every executed instruction does so relative to
the current program state, and different paths in a function are
taken depending on the initial program state.
Software Ethology performs its analysis by instantiating a
specific program state before function execution, and then
measures the program state post-execution. Measurable pro-
gram state changes are writes to locations pointed to by
pointers, data structures, and variables whose valid lifetimes
do not end when the function returns. These types of changes
necessarily must be made to registers or memory addresses
outside the function’s stack frame. We also consider the
immediate return value of a function to be a measurable
program state change, but exclude changes to general purpose
registers (e.g., rbx on x64) and state registers (e.g., rsp).
They are excluded because, for caller-saved general purpose
registers, their values are immediately irrelevant upon function
return, and state registers have no bearing on function seman-
tics. Additionally, measurable program state changes preclude
modifications to kernel state not reported to user space.
While executing, functions make changes to program state
as directed by their instructions and the current program state.
A valid program state for one function might cause another
function to fault, and the same function can perform arbitrarily
different actions based on the program state upon invocation.
Therefore, a function implicitly defines the input program
states it accepts — states where the function can run and
return without triggering a fatal fault — and the corresponding
output program states based upon these input states. A function
accordingly defines input program states it rejects by triggering
a fault when provided a semantically invalid input state. We
call these accepting input and corresponding output program
states Input/Output Vectors, or IOVecs. A function A is said
to accept an IOVec I if A accepts the input program state
from I , and the resulting state from executing A matches the
expected program state from I . If either of these conditions
do not hold, then A rejects I . See § IV-B for the discussion
of matching program states.
Assuming functions make changes to input program states
which are measurable post-execution, we can reframe semantic
function identification. Precisely identifying a function can be
seen as identifying the full set of IOVecs which a function
accepts. We call that set the characteristic IOVec set (CIS).
Consider the toy example in Listing 6. An accepting input
program state is one that has the first argument set to any
integer, the second argument set to any integer except 0,
and the third argument set to any properly mapped memory
address. The memory location pointed to by c can initially
have any value. The corresponding output program state has
the return value set to 0, and the memory location pointed to
by c contains the value of a/b. An IOVec is a single concrete
tuple of accepting input state and corresponding output state,
and CISmy div is the full set of IOVecs my_div accepts. Note
that only the first two arguments, the location pointed to by
c, and the return value, are relevant, and that neither the full
address space nor every register value are relevant.
Every function has a CIS, and we hypothesize that most
functions have a unique (non-empty) CIS. A set of functions
that share a CIS is called an equivalence class. An example
of an equivalence class is the set of various architecture
specific implementations of memmove in glibc, e.g., __-
memmove_sse2 or __memmove_avx512. For the sake of
brevity, unless otherwise noted, when we refer to a function,
we are actually referring to an equivalence class of functions
with equal functionality.
In the general case, a function’s CIS is unbounded. So for
practical reasons, we attempt to find a subset of a function’s
CIS, which we call the distinguishing characteristic IOVec
set, or DCIS. A DCIS for function f , DCISf , consists
entirely of IOVecs which f accepts, and only f accepts every
member of DCISf . Another function, g, might accept a mem-
ber of DCISf , but there is at least one IOVec I ∈ DCISf
which g does not accept. Software Ethology is used to identify
a function foo in a binary by providing foo with IOVecs
Ij ∈ DCISf . If foo accepts all Ijs, then we say that
foo ≡ f .
Software Ethology needs an oracle to provide IOVecs in
order to semantically identify functions, but there is no defini-
tive source of IOVecs. Tinbergen was designed to be one such
oracle, but other oracles can be devised. For example, IOVecs
can be derived from unit tests or inferred from a specification.
IOVecs also do not need to capture large portions of the
address space in order for Software Ethology to be useful.
Instead, IOVecs only need to contain the data that functions
access, and oracles providing IOVecs can make any attempt at
minimizing the data in an IOVec.
The number of IOVecs Software Ethology needs in order to
be precise is highly dependent on the diversity and number of
functions analyzed. The minimal theoretical number of needed
IOVecs is equal to the number of functions being analyzed,
because Software Ethology needs at least one accepting IOVec
to identify and distinguish a function. However, it is likely
more IOVecs are needed to precisely distinguish functions, but,
the use of differences in semantic behavior for discrimination
minimizes the number of required IOVecs.
A. Software Ethology Design
Software Ethology performs its analysis in two phases: a
coalescing phase and an identification phase. The coalescing
phase, which only needs to be run once, is where functions are
classified by IOVec acceptances and rejections, and ordered
into a binary tree accordingly. The second phase is where
unknown functions are semantically identified by providing
the unknown functions with specific IOVecs from the binary
tree, and traversing the tree according to IOVec acceptance.
Coalescing Phase: Software Ethology starts its analysis
by providing every function in its training set with every
IOVec the oracle provides. This establishes a full ground truth
of which IOVecs are accepted and rejected, ensuring that
proper ordering can be achieved. When an IOVec is given
to a function f , one of four results can occur:
1) The function receives a fatal signal (e.g., SIGSEGV),
due to an improper input program state.
2) The function does not return before a specified timeout.
3) The function returns, but the final program state differs
from the expected output program state.
4) The function returns, and the final program matches the
expected output program state.
IOVecs that satisfy the last result are added to DCISf . As
future work, we want to incorporate rejected IOVecs into the
identification process, as rejected IOVecs classify the rejected
semantics of this function.
The result of the coalescing is a proposed DCIS for every
function in the training set, which is then fed to a decision
tree generator. The output decision tree contains IOVecs as
interior nodes, and functions at leaves, and can be used for
semantically identifying any number of functions later. As
the tree is generated using differences in semantic behavior,
it only grows linearly in the worst case. Every path from root
to leaf encodes a minimal DCIS needed to distinguish one
function from every other in the tree. If the same path in the
decision tree maps to more than one function, then a potential
equivalence class exists in the binary. The functions in the
leaf are those for which the generated DCIS is insufficient
to fully distinguish one function from another. This can be
because the generated IOVecs cover the functionality poorly,
or the functions are truly an equivalence class.
Identification Phase: To semantically identify functions,
the analyst provides the Software Ethology implementation
with an unknown binary and the generated decision tree from
the coalescing phase. For every function in the unknown binary
the following procedure is performed. Starting from the root
of the decision tree, the IOVec is given to the unknown
function. If the IOVec is accepted, the true branch in the
decision tree is taken; otherwise, the false branch is taken.
The unknown function is then tested against another IOVec
depending on the path taken. When the path arrives at a leaf,
the unknown function is tested against one more IOVec from
the leaf function’s DCIS for confirmation. Again, if the IOVec
is accepted, then the function is given the label of the function
at the leaf. If the unknown function gets to a leaf and remains
unconfirmed, then the function is labeled as unknown.
IV. TINBERGEN IMPLEMENTATION
Tinbergen serves as an oracle for Software Ethology. Ideally,
a formal specification of a function’s semantics would allow us
to generate a minimal DCIS. However, such a specification is
often not available, and we are forced to infer valid IOVecs. To
that end, Tinbergen uses dynamic instrumentation to precisely
control and monitor execution, and adapts techniques from
state-of-the-art fuzzers to generate IOVecs, leveraging code
coverage as an optimization and approximation of IOVec state
coverage. Tinbergen utilizes the knowledge about language
concepts, such as the calling convention or the existence of
pointers. This is purely an implementation aspect, and different
language semantics would have to be accounted for to use
Software Ethology. For example, the structure of IOVecs will
change when analyzing Java applications, because there is
no concept of a pointer in Java. Nevertheless, program state
change as a semantic identifier can be applied universally.
With the release of American Fuzzy Lop [28] in 2015,
fuzzing became an invaluable part of many large profile
projects [29]. Fuzz testers, or fuzzers, come in many flavors,
but mutational coverage-guided greybox fuzzers — the most
widely used class of fuzzers today [28], [30]–[41] — are the
most relevant to Tinbergen. Mutational fuzzers do not require
any specification or expert knowledge of the target application;
a small input file containing a few bytes often generates high
code path coverage. Since we have no information about
an unknown function’s semantic behavior, the ideas behind
feedback-guided mutational fuzzing are useful in discovering
IOVecs. By rapidly feeding a function random inputs, and
measuring the program state change post-execution, we can
build a corpus of function identification data without any a
priori knowledge. We chose fuzzing as our exploration strat-
egy because fuzzing is optimized to maximize code coverage,
leading to maximal program state change coverage. We do
not need full path or code coverage to be accurate, only
enough program state change coverage (i.e., data coverage)
to differentiate semantics.
A. Exploration Phase
Figure 2 shows the overall design of the first phase of
Tinbergen’s binary analysis. Tinbergen supports analyzing any
executable code, including shared libraries. Static libraries
need to be included in either a shared library or executable.
Tinbergen requires neither the source nor any debug infor-
mation, however, it does need boundary information of each
function in an executable, or the exported symbol names in a
shared library. Recent work shows that this information can be
recovered even for stripped binaries [23], [24]. Once provided
with this information, Tinbergen enters its exploration phase,
employing coverage-guided fuzzing as a way to infer valid
IOVecs.
For each Function Under Test (FUT), Tinbergen fuzzes
the input arguments and non-pointer memory object data if
any have been deduced, and then begins executing the FUT
with this randomized program state. If that program state is
accepted, then the newly discovered IOVec is returned, and
Tinbergen examines the coverage it produced. If the IOVec
produced new coverage, it is added to the FUT’s DCIS,
otherwise, it is discarded. Either way, the IOVec in the FUT’s
DCIS that produced the most coverage (or a completely new,
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IOVec Data Use
Random seed Input program state initialization
Pointer input arguments Input program state initialization
Memory object information Input program state initialization
Code coverage Fuzzer seed selection
Expected return value Post-execution state comparison
Expected memory state byte values Post-execution state comparison
Unique system calls Post-execution state comparison
Originating architecture IOVec translation
Fig. 4: Data stored in IOVecs.
randomized IOVec in case the DCIS is empty) is chosen
as a seed for additional fuzzing. This process continues until
the code coverage exceeds a user-defined threshold. Tinbergen
supports arbitrary fuzzers that allow intermediate seed export,
and we similarly support different coverage metrics of the
underlying fuzzer.
Tinbergen stores the input program state and expected
program state post-execution in an IOVec. Storing the entire
address space is both a waste of storage and imprecise. Instead,
IOVecs save the data listed in Figure 4. Memory object
information is the coarse-grained input layout and global
memory objects inferred during the generation of the IOVec,
and includes location, size, and pointer sub-member offsets.
While generating IOVecs, Tinbergen uses code coverage to
select an IOVec to mutate, so we include the instructions
executed by the FUT when provided with the IOVec.
Prior to execution, the program state is initialized according
to the current IOVec. The memory object information for
both input and global data is inferred during the exploration
phase, and is allocated only for the current IOVec. Non-pointer
values for data structures and function input arguments are
setup using the random seed stored with the IOVec, while
assuring that the same initial values are consistently applied
across executions. Data pointer sub-members are properly
assigned based on their locations specified by the IOVec,
and then the function is executed with the newly established
memory state. While our experiments did not require us to
pass arguments into the FUT on the stack, we still support
such functionality as we have full control over the initial
stack pointer. Once complete, the resulting program state is
either stored if generating new IOVecs, or compared with the
expected program state.
B. Matching Program States
Software Ethology uses matching program states to differ-
entiate and classify functions’ semantics. Here, we present our
definition of matching states that Tinbergen uses to identify C
functions.
Recall that our notion of input program state includes
memory objects for both global data as well as input argu-
ments. Semantically similar functions modify memory objects
in similar ways (if at all), so we capture the resulting memory
state of allocated objects post-execution. Due to our fine-
grained control over the memory state, any pointer value
(either as an input argument or as a structure sub-member)
is the same across executions. The allocated memory objects
can be any arbitrary data structure, containing a mix of pointer
Policy Instruction t Tainted? u Tainted? Taint Policy
1 t = u Yes No T(u); R(t)
2 t = u No Yes
3 t = u Yes Yes
4 t = t ◦ u Any Any
Fig. 5: Backwards Taint Propagation. t and u can be a register
or memory address. T(x) taints x and R(x) removes taint from
x. ◦ denotes any logic or arithmetic operator.
crash
Fix1     movq  %rdi,-0x8(%rbp)
2  testb  $7, %dil
3  je  .LBB0_4
4  movq   %rax,-0x8(%rbp)
5 .LBB0_2:
6  cmpb   $0, (%rax)
Fig. 6: Backwards taint analysis to fix pointer arguments.
and non-pointer data at various locations within the structure.
Program states match when non-pointer values in memory
regions are byte-wise the same, and any pointers to sub-objects
are located at the same offset from the object start. If there is
a single mismatch in memory objects between two program
states, then the states do not match.
Return values are also pertinent, but can be implementation
dependent. We recognize two types of return values: pointers
and non-pointers. Due to the lack of any type information in
binaries, precisely determining if a return value is a pointer
is challenging. We conservatively test if the return value
maps to a readable region in memory, and if it does, we
designate the return value as a pointer. If a return value is not
readable in memory, then we consider it a non-pointer, and can
represent functions that perform raw computations (e.g., sin
or toupper), or adhere to a contract (e.g., strcmp which
can return any value < 0, = 0, or > 0).
Finally, because system calls provide services that cannot
be provided by user-space code and cannot be optimized out,
semantically equivalent functions must invoke the same set
of system calls. Order and number of system calls made,
however, can differ among semantically equivalent functions
(e.g., calling read(fd, 1) 4 times could be the same as
calling read(fd, 4) once). Therefore, we include the set of
unique system calls invoked while executing with the specific
input as part of the IOVec. Semantically equivalent functions
must invoke the same set of system calls, and can execute
neither more nor fewer unique system calls.
For two program states to match, the values contained in
return registers must match in the following ways. Return
values must both be pointers or non-pointers. As we do not
know the size of the underlying memory region, we do not
check the underlying memory values if the return values are
pointers; we simply say the return values match. Without more
sophisticated analysis, this can be a source of inaccuracy. If
the return values are non-pointers, they must be equal, or both
must be positive or negative. If all input pointers (including
pointers to all sub-objects) match, the return values match, and
the same set of system calls are invoked, then the two program
states match. As we do not perform any static analysis, void
functions will also go through return value analysis, leading
to another source of potential imprecision.
C. Pointer Derivation
A major challenge to generating high-quality IOVecs is the
detection of pointers as input. As binaries contain no type
information, determining if an input argument is a pointer is
an ongoing research topic [42], [43]. Without recovering which
arguments are pointers, determining a DCIS for a function
is generally impossible, and only incomplete behavior will be
captured.
A simple solution would replace an invalid address with a
valid address before an illegal dereference occurs. While such
a solution has been successfully used to solve other problems
in binary analysis [44], [45], it would not work in Software
Ethology, because the underlying problem — semantically, an
input is supposed to be a pointer when it is not — remains
unsolved. Software Ethology relies on capturing program state
changes that arise from executing a function with a specific
input program state. By replacing an illegal address in situ, the
resulting output program state does not necessarily arise from
actions performed given the initial state, and an IOVec with an
input state and an unrelated output state would be generated.
Consider the code in Figure 6, which is adapted from the
strlen assembly in Figure 1. The first pointer argument
(passed in using register rdi) is stored on the stack (line 1).
Later, that address is written to register rax (line 4), and then
is dereferenced and compared with the null terminator (line
6). Our fuzzing strategy is unlikely to supply a valid address
as input, and line 6 will cause a SIGSEGV signal to be issued.
The simple approach would replace the invalid address in
rax with a valid address. If the function later returns with
no other issue, then Tinbergen would register strlen as
accepting the input program state with rdi set to a random
(non-pointer) value. This is incorrect, and during the identifi-
cation phase, an implementation of strlen in an unknown
binary would not accept the input program state. That strlen
implementation would then be marked with an incorrect label.
The solution we propose is a backwards taint analysis
inspired by Wang et al. [15]. While generating IOVecs in its
exploration phase, Tinbergen records immediate register values
before every instruction executes, and, if a segmentation fault
occurs, we get the register containing the faulty address, which
is the taint source. Tinbergen then uses the saved register
values to propagate the taint back to a root sink. The taint
propagation policy is listed in Figure 5. Starting from the last
executed instruction, each instruction is parsed in reverse order
until all instructions are iterated through. The root sink is the
last tainted register or memory address after all instructions
are processed.
After sink discovery, Tinbergen searches for previously
allocated memory objects. If no object is found near the fault-
ing address, then Tinbergen builds a new memory object by
allocating a fixed-size memory region, and records the current
location and size of the object. Tinbergen uses this information
for inferring new bounds and pointer sub-members if another
segmentation fault occurs after execution restarts. Analysts can
use the bounds information for more sophisticated analysis
after decision tree generation. Once the object has been created
or updated, Tinbergen writes the pointer to the sink, and begins
executing the FUT from its beginning using the newly adjusted
program state.
The backwards taint analysis restarts with every segmenta-
tion fault until the FUT successfully returns. When the FUT
actually completes, Tinbergen records the correctly initialized
input program state, the corresponding output program state,
and the coarse-grained object structure derived from the back-
wards taint analysis. Tinbergen only tracks which memory
areas are supposed to be pointers, and no other semantic
meaning is given to memory regions containing non-pointer
data. Further fuzzing iterations maintain the memory object
structure, and only the non-pointer memory areas are fuzzed.
V. EVALUATION
Our evaluation focuses on 64-bit System-V Linux binaries
derived from C source code. Our implementation uses the
Valgrind [43] binary translator, with 3, 848 lines of C code,
and 2, 392 lines of Python. As Valgrind readily supports
Windows (through the Windows Subsystem for Linux) and 32-
bit systems, adding support for these systems would require
only minor engineering efforts. Valgrind supports diverse
architectures, and our implementation so far covers x64 and
AArch64. Tinbergen performs its taint analysis using Val-
grind’s architecture independent intermediate representation
(VEX), so supporting additional architectures does not require
significant modifications. Instead, developer effort is limited
to providing necessary ABI information (e.g., the return value
register), and a recompilation.
We performed our evaluation using an Intel Core i7-6700K
CPU, with 32 GB of RAM, and running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS.
We address the following research questions:
1) How accurate and scalable is Software Ethology in
identifying functions in binaries?
2) Is Software Ethology truly resilient against compilation
environment diversity?
3) Do IOVecs generated by Software Ethology apply to
other architectures?
4) Does Tinbergen create meaningful equivalence classes?
Our results do in fact show that Software Ethology is a feasi-
ble and accurate semantic function identifier. Additionally, our
results show that Software Ethology is largely unaffected by
compilation environment changes, and that Software Ethology
can quickly identify previously analyzed functions. Our large-
scale real-world application evaluation shows that Software
Ethology can scale to large binaries. Finally, we show that
IOVecs truly preserve semantics by achieving high accuracy
when identifying functions in both purposefully obfuscated
and AArch64 binaries.
A. Accuracy Amid Environment Changes
To conduct our evaluation of Tinbergen’s accuracy, we se-
lected wc, realpath, and uniq from coreutils-8.32,
which represent medium-sized applications using the default
compilation environment. We compiled the set of applications
using gcc 7.5.0 [46] and clang 6.0.0 [47], at O0–O3
optimization levels. We then built a decision tree (see § IV-A)
for each application, for a total of 24 decision trees. The total
amount of fuzzing time allocated for generating IOVecs was
limited to 5 hours, after which the coalescing phase was al-
lowed as much time as necessary. See § V-C for timing details.
Each tree was used to identify functions in du, dir, ls, ptx,
sort, true, logname, whoami, uname, and dirname,
each also compiled using gcc 7.5.0 and clang 6.0.0
at O0–O3 optimization levels. These applications represent
the 5 largest and smallest applications as determined by the
default coreutils compilation environment. In order to
establish ground truth, we compiled all binaries with debug
symbols enabled. However, Tinbergen does not use them for
its analyses, and they were only used for determining accuracy
after all analyses had completed.
We report the geometric mean F-Score (harmonic mean of
precision and recall) across all compilation environments. In
order to determine the correctness of a label, we performed a
simple string comparison between the name of the FUT and
the functions in the assigned equivalence class. If any matched,
we record the function name as the assigned label, otherwise
we use the name of the first function in the equivalence class
as the assigned label. If a function is not matched to an
equivalence class, we label the function as “Unknown”. We
then search for the function name among all the classified
functions in the decision tree. The ground truth label is the
function name if it appears in the classified function list,
or “Unknown” if the function name is not in the classified
list. The classification labels and ground truth labels are then
given to the sklearn.metrics Python module for F-Score
calculation.
Figure 7 shows the geometric mean F-Score Tinbergen
achieved with decision trees from a specific compilation
environment. Each row reports the accuracy of all decision
trees from the specific compilation environment has when used
to identify functions in binaries generated with a specific com-
pilation environment (presented as the columns). The diagonal
numbers (in bold) are, therefore, the accuracy rates when the
decision trees and evaluation suite match in both compiler
and optimization level. They are unsurprisingly among the
most accurate Tinbergen achieved, and represent the data most
reported by related work. Overall, we achieve a high .779
accuracy rate, but the diagonal numbers — the numbers which
allow for the best apples-to-apples comparison with related
works — is .893. The generally high F-Scores across compi-
lation environments indicate that our accuracy largely comes
from Tinbergen’s ability to identify functions it has classified,
and not from simply assigning an unknown classification to
functions it has not identified. These results show that Software
Suite
D-Tree O0 O1 O2 O3
LLVM gcc LLVM gcc LLVM gcc LLVM gcc
O0
LLVM .874 .829 .728 .691 .702 .667 .694 .743
gcc .852 .851 .726 .685 .691 .655 .691 .736
O1
LLVM .661 .692 .891 .636 .753 .690 .718 .671
gcc .848 .811 .815 .852 .808 .782 .804 .854
O2
LLVM .723 .744 .836 .736 .929 .789 .916 .752
gcc .710 .757 .835 .718 .828 .892 .830 .799
O3
LLVM .723 .742 .835 .735 .929 .798 .926 .760
gcc .849 .830 .825 .819 .822 .848 .820 .932
Fig. 7: Geometric mean F-Score for coreutils-8.32 per
decision tree compilation environment (rows) across evaluation
suite compilation environments.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
0
200
400
509
129
48 24 17 1 10 4 0 8
Fig. 8: Distribution of all equivalence class sizes across
all decision trees in the coreutils-8.32 evaluation.
Ethology is accurate as a semantic function identifier, as well
as largely resilient to compilation environments (Research
Questions 1 and 2).
Unfortunately, the two closest systems to Tinbergen,
BLEX [13] and IMF-SIM [15], are not available publicly.
The BLEX authors supplied us their code, but it required
significant engineering to execute with currently distributed
Python modules. We invested two weeks of development and
evaluation time. The accuracy we evaluated was much lower,
but this could be attributed to the required engineering changes
or changes in the imported modules. The IMF-SIM authors
remained unresponsive. We, therefore, base our comparison
with related work on the published numbers, and call for open-
sourcing of research prototypes. The BLEX authors report
an average accuracy of .50–.64 across three compilers (they
added Intel’s icc compiler) and four optimization levels, and
the IMF-SIM authors report an average accuracy of .57–.66
across three compilers and three optimization levels. Both
systems attempt to build a classification vector from code
measurements, and their lowest accuracies come from labeling
functions in binaries from compilation environments different
from their source models. Tinbergen, in contrast, is accurate
regardless of compilation environment, as evidenced by the
off-diagonal numbers in Figure 7. With a geometric mean
accuracy of .766, our results show an average 25%–53%
increase in accuracy in differing compilation environments
over these works. The inaccuracy in BLEX and IMF-SIM
arises from the fact that code measurements are not a true
reflection of function semantics, but are instead one way to
express function semantics from a large and diverse space of
possible semantic expressions. The trained models they gen-
erate become inaccurate when presented differently optimized
code, because they only capture a small portion of the possible
semantic expression space. Tinbergen achieves its accuracy by
actually measuring a function’s semantics through program
state change, and does not approximate function semantics
through code measurements.
Despite its higher accuracy, Tinbergen does have inaccuracy.
We identify two major sources of inaccuracy: an overly strict
program state comparison, and kernel state dependence leading
to low-quality IOVecs.
Strict Program State Comparison: In § IV-B, we detailed
our policy for comparing program states, which we use in
lieu of code measurements for determining semantic similarity.
We opted for a strict policy where both return values and
allocated memory areas must match exactly in order for an
IOVec to be accepted. However, at lower optimization levels,
we might capture dead stores that are optimized out at higher
optimization levels. For example, the c_isprint function,
which returns a single byte, contains an additional movzx in-
struction in O0 not present in any later optimization level. This
instruction operates on the return register, which changes the
higher order bits, while higher optimization levels simply write
to the lowest byte in the return register without changing any
further bit value. The write to the higher order bits is a dead
store, since any caller will only ever read the lowest byte of the
return register. However, we capture this behavior in an IOVec,
and our strict return value comparison policy often determines
the return values to be different, leading to a mislabel. This is
not a fundamental flaw with Software Ethology, but an artifact
of our program state matching policy. A different policy that
more precisely compares relevant program state could better
account for inconsequential program state changes.
Kernel State Dependence: For simplicity, we designed
Tinbergen to assume nothing when generating IOVecs, and
it always executes functions in isolation. However, there are
functions (e.g., close and munmap) that depend on the
results of previous functions in order for the input arguments
to be semantically correct. For instance, close requires that
the input integer be a valid open file descriptor (as obtained
from open), and any input that is not a valid file descriptor
is semantically incorrect. Because Tinbergen does not perform
any initial setup to obtain semantically correct input values,
any IOVec generated for these functions only exercise the
error checking functionality, which is likely to be similar to
many other functions. This has two negative effects: unrelated
functions get grouped into an equivalence class, and unrelated
FUTs can be assigned to this equivalence class simply because
O0 O1 O2 O3
LLVM gcc LLVM gcc LLVM gcc LLVM gcc
N 78 73 72 52 38 32 36 40
N 1.76 1.85 1.82 1.68 1.78 1.47 1.69 1.69
Fig. 9: Geometric mean count of classified functions (N ),
average number of functions per equivalence class (N ) for
all coreutils-8.32 generated decision trees. The median
equivalence class size is 1.00 for all decision trees.
they share similar error handling behavior. This is, again, not a
fundamental flaw in Software Ethology, but instead is a result
of Tinbergen’s focus on user-space functions. We expect that
our accuracy would improve significantly if we added some
common environmental activities (e.g., opening file descriptors
or memory mapping address spaces) to our IOVec design.
We keep it as future work to incorporate application specific
environmental setup to Tinbergen.
B. Equivalence Class Distributions
Figure 9 shows the geometric mean number of classified
functions (N ), and the average number of functions per
equivalence class (N ). Ideally, N should be close to one, as
most functions provide unique and singular functionality, and
thus should be assigned as the sole member of an unique
equivalence class. However, with the existence of wrapper
functions, it is likely N will be higher. It nevertheless should
be low, because one could trivially get high accuracy by
grouping all functions into the same equivalence class. As
Figure 9 shows, we achieve a low N across our decision trees,
which indicates that our fuzzing strategy is a generally sound
technique for generating sufficiently distinctive IOVecs. Ad-
ditionally, the equivalence class size distributions in Figure 8
show that we are creating hundreds of equivalence classes with
one or two functions per equivalence class, which provides
evidence that we satisfy Research Question 4. We, therefore,
claim that our accuracy comes from Tinbergen’s ability to
distinguish function semantics, and that Tinbergen does not
simply group all functions into a few equivalence classes.
There are equivalence classes containing a large (10+) num-
ber of functions. These are cases where our fuzzing strategy
was unable to trigger deep functionality, yet the classified func-
tions share a common failure mode (e.g., return −1 for invalid
input), or very similar functionality. For example, there is a 12
function sized equivalence class in the realpath clang-
O1 decision tree that contains 8 functions strcaseeq[0-
7] that perform the same action with increasingly fewer input
arguments. Improvements in related fuzzing work, especially
works that improve deep code coverage [38], [48], will directly
translate to an improvement of IOVec generation, and a
reduction of the size of these equivalence classes.
C. Training and Labeling Time
Tinbergen is scalable in both training time and storage
requirements. On average, Tinbergen takes 24.3 CPU hours
to generate a decision tree, which includes generating IOVecs
and the coalescing phase described in § IV-A. As stated before,
quote quotearg
quotearg_char quotearg_colon
set_program_name
Fig. 10: An equivalence class in an LLVM O0 decision tree.
however, this analysis only needs to be done one time. Once
the decision tree is generated, semantic analysis is very quick,
taking, on average, only 13.0 CPU minutes to classify a
binary in the evaluation set. Additionally, all operations in
both of Tinbergen’s phases represent completely independent
work loads, and as such are embarrassingly parallel. Therefore,
execution time varies with the available hardware. Further-
more, the generated decision tree size is very small, with an
geometric mean size of 855.9 KB. So, while IOVecs have no
upper bound in their spatial size as they record the memory
state of relevant inputs and their sub-members, in practice they
are small.
BLEX reports 1, 368 CPU hours for training, and 30 CPU
minutes to classify a binary in coreutils. IMF-SIM takes
1, 027 CPU hours for training, and 31 CPU minutes to
classify a coreutils binary. Due to significant hardware
differences between our respective experimental setups, and
the lack of available source code for the related work, we
cannot make any fair quantitative comparison. However, we
believe that we are faster at semantic queries as we organize
past analysis in a tree structure; BLEX and IMF-SIM must
compare the feature vector they record with every past feature
vector, creating an O(log(n)) vs. O(n) search performance
disparity. Neither works report spatial size of their feature
vectors, however BLEX and IMF-SIM restrict the number of
instructions executed, which caps the size of their respective
feature vectors.
D. Equivalence Classes and Imprecision
To provide a concrete example of an equivalence class,
as well as illustrate the issues with accuracy, we highlight
a specific, large equivalence class generated for the wc LLVM
O0 decision tree. The functions comprising this equivalence
class are listed in Figure 10, and include various functions that
return strings used for printing command line arguments, and
a void function used to set a global variable containing the
name of the called application.
The equivalence class size highlights the effectiveness and
limitations of our fuzzing strategy and state comparison policy.
All functions take a char* as their first argument, quote
and quotearg are both wrappers for the same function,
quotearg_n_options. Additionally, quotearg_colon
is just a wrapper function for quotearg_char, but un-
surprisingly supplies the colon character as input, while
quotearg_char is a wrapper for quotearg. Tinbergen
reasonably groups these functions into an equivalence class
(providing evidence for Research Question 4). While our
short fuzzing campaigns did not capture the subtle differences
between the various functions, longer campaigns or better
fuzzers will likely do so.
set_program_name is placed in this equivalence class
(despite being a void function) because the return register is
used as a scratch register holding a valid pointer. Therefore,
our program state equivalence check detailed in § IV-B passes
for all generated IOVecs. As future work we plan to incor-
porate detailed global memory accesses into IOVecs, which
should prevent such cases. set_program_name illustrates
a common source of inaccuracy when using classification data
from differing binaries. Recall that the decision trees were
created using a single binary. Even though another binary
might have the same function present, Tinbergen will likely
mislabel that version of set_program_name, because the
IOVecs generated for that function will encode the name
of the source binary as part of the expected program state.
Other binaries will likely not be named the same, and thus
our program state matching policy detailed in § IV-B will
erroneously determine the two functions as different. Luckily,
as our evaluation shows, these types of functions are rare in
practice.
VI. CASE STUDIES
We provide three case studies that demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our approach.
A. Accuracy Against Obfuscated Code
Malware authors will often employ code obfuscation to
impede binary analysis [49], [50]. Code obfuscation attempts
to hide semantic meaning through code transformations, such
as adding unrelated control-flow or instruction substitution,
while still preserving the intended function semantics. Code-
based semantic analysis can be stymied when attempting to
identify purposefully obfuscated code, because the resulting
code is far from “normal,” and thus hard to correlate with mod-
els derived from unobfuscated binaries. Software Ethology,
however, relies on semantic (rather than code) measurements
guaranteed to be preserved by code obfuscators. Therefore,
Tinbergen should largely be unaffected by code obfuscation.
To test this hypothesis, we compiled our coreutils
suite (du, dir, ls, ptx, sort, true, logname, whoami,
uname, and dirname) using the LLVM-Obfuscator (OL-
LVM) [51] at O2, enabling separately the bogus control-flow
(bcf), control-flow flattening (fla), and instruction substitution
(sub) obfuscations. Following the experimental methodology
of the IMF-SIM authors, we used the O0 decision trees to
measure semantic function identification accuracy in each
of the three respective obfuscated binaries, using the same
accuracy measurement metric described in § V-A.
The results are listed in Figure 11. We match or exceed the
results achieved by IMF-SIM, with an average increase in ac-
curacy of 39.3%. As our accuracy against obfuscated binaries
closely matches our accuracy against unobfuscated binaries,
we provide evidence that Tinbergen (and, by extension, Soft-
ware Ethology in general) is unaffected by existing obfuscation
techniques. Any inaccuracy when identifying functions in
obfuscated binaries comes from the same sources as analyzing
normal binaries, as discussed in § V-A and § V-D. Furthermore,
Tinbergen IMF-SIM % Difference
bcf 0.787 0.385 105
fla 0.772 0.576 34.1
g
c
c
sub 0.752 0.664 13.2
bcf 0.806 0.513 57.1
fla 0.795 0.649 22.5
L
L
V
M
sub 0.813 0.779 4.30
Fig. 11: Obfuscated Code Accuracy Comparison
O0 O1 O2 O3
LLVM gcc LLVM gcc LLVM gcc LLVM gcc
1 .835 .805 .789 .840 .797 .803 .795 .860
2 .820 .803 .766 .794 .740 .761 .737 .842
3 .880 .866 .833 .791 .799 .849 .796 .877
Fig. 12: F-Scores for identifying functions in coreutils-
gcc-O3 AArch64 binaries using decision trees generated
from x64 wc (1), realpath (2), and uniq (3).
these results also give evidence that Research Question 2 is
answered, as not only are the binaries purposefully obfuscated,
but are also compiled using a much older version of LLVM
than our evaluation version.
B. AArch64 Evaluation
Function semantics are mainly determined by the high level
source code written by the programmer, and remain largely
constant across architectures. Unless explicitly dictated by the
programmer through the use of preprocessing macros, the
same function compiled for one architecture will perform the
same corresponding program state change in another. How the
input state is established, and how the resulting program state
is determined post-execution will change with architecture,
but semantics do not — x86 strlen, for instance, does
not suddenly change functionality when compiled for Mips.
Therefore, an IOVec generated for one architecture is usable
for another architecture, as long as there is a suitable IOVec
translation between the two.
To that end, we implemented a simple IOVec translation
layer between x64 and AArch64. The translation consists
solely of a mapping between the argument passing registers
and return register used by the two architectures, e.g., rsi on
x64 is mapped to x1 in AArch64, and rax is mapped to
x0. As we do not yet support stack argument passing, only
the smaller set of argument registers are translated, which may
slightly lower accuracy. However, as most functions have a
relatively low arity, our translation layer is adequate for the
majority of semantic identification tasks.
We evaluated Tinbergen’s cross-architecture accuracy by
compiling the du and dirname (the largest and smallest
binaries in our evaluation suite) on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B
Rev 1.2 running Ubuntu 20.04 using the ARM gcc-9.3.0
compiler at O3 optimization. We then used the unmodified
decision trees generated for the evaluation described in § V-A
to identify functions in the ARM binaries. The results are
presented in Figure 12, with each column listing the accuracy
O0 O1 O2 O3
LLVM gcc LLVM gcc LLVM gcc LLVM gcc
A - .871 .717 .850 .759 .746 .765 .772
B - .781 .633 .695 .629 .642 .629 .639
C - .794 .699 .802 .701 .722 .700 .733
Fig. 13: F-Scores identifying functions in libz (A), libpng
(B), and libxml2 (C) using a clang-O0 decision tree. We
did not evaluate against the clang-O0 binary.
libz libpng libxml2
N 126 390 2080
N 2.47 2.48 2.44
T 17.0 25.4 158
Fig. 14: Decision tree (N ), average equivalence class sizes
(N ), and CPU hours needed to generate the decision tree (T )
for large binaries.
achieved using the x64 decision tree generated with the
enumerated compilation environment.
Tinbergen achieves a geometric mean F-Score of .811 across
all the evaluated binaries, similar to our native geometric mean
of .779. As our accuracy is largely unaffected by architecture,
we strengthen our claim that Tinbergen captures function
semantics, and provide evidence that we answer Research
Question 3. Additionally, we also provide further evidence that
we answer Research Question 1, as the gcc version used for
this evaluation differs from the version used to generate the
decision trees.
C. Large Shared Libraries
An analysis framework that does not scale is unlikely to
be useful to researchers and engineers. Our coreutils
evaluation enables a comparison with related work. However,
we want to demonstrate the scalability of Tinbergen to larger,
more complex binaries.
We chose zlib, libpng, and libxml2 as a set of shared
libraries that are ubiquitous and among the largest distributed
with Ubuntu. We compiled each library using gcc 7.5.0
and clang 6.0.0 at O0–O3 optimization levels, generated
a decision tree for the clang-O0 binary, and identified
functions in the remaining binaries. Due to the larger size
of the binaries involved, we allowed the fuzzing campaign to
execute for 10 hours, and provided as much time as needed
for coalescing. In order to handle the significant increase in
functions, we used a machine with 45GB memory to generate
the decision tree for libxml2 (running Debian 9.3 on an
Intel Xeon 3106). The machine listed in § V-A was used for
all other evaluation tasks. The 50% increase in memory to
process at least a 10x increase function count is a reasonable
cost, and does not detract from our scalability claim.
Figure 13 and Figure 14 list the accuracy measured (using
the same accuracy metric at in § V-A), along with the number
of functions classified (N ), average number of functions per
equivalence class (N ), and CPU time required to generate the
decision tree (T ). Tinbergen achieves similar F-Scores as in
our coreutils evaluation, demonstrating the accuracy and
scalability of our approach (Research Question 1). However,
the number of functions per equivalence class is higher than
our coreutils evaluation. This is a consequence of our
simplistic coverage-guided fuzzer, as well as increased genuine
similar functionality. For example, there are functions in zlib
(e.g., gzoffset and gzoffset64) which only differ in
the bit count of their input arguments, but otherwise perform
the same action. There are also a large group of functions
which first performs a sanity check on the input. The fuzzer
did not create inputs to pass these checks, and the functions
are grouped into an equivalence class. Although inferring
valid input is an ongoing research topic [37], [38], [48], both
of these problems can be mitigated with a longer fuzzing
campaign and/or a more sophisticated fuzzer.
VII. DISCUSSION
Here we provide discussion on the limitations of Software
Ethology, and on when a function is designated as unknown.
Limitations: We have identified a few sets of functions
that Software Ethology is unlikely to classify or identify
correctly. These functions are highly dependent upon the
system environment and execution context while generating
IOVecs, as well as during the identification phase. Functions
like getcwd or getuid, which return the current working di-
rectory and the user ID respectively, depend on the filesystem,
current user, and kernel state. As these factors differ between
runs or are non-deterministic, they violate our fundamental
assumption — semantically similar functions change their
program state in similar ways given a specific input program
state. To address this limitation, Tinbergen could model the
system state in addition to the process state.
Another set of functions Software Ethology struggles with
depend on an initial seed being set beforehand. Examples of
these functions include rand and time. As we execute func-
tions without any knowledge about their behavior, we cannot
provide the seed beforehand as it is difficult to distinguish a
seed value from other global variables. Even if we determine
a location of the seed, knowledge of proper API usage (e.g.,
calling srand before rand) is needed to correctly use these
functions. Discerning correct API usage is an active research
area [52], and improvements in this area will directly translate
to improvements in Tinbergen.
Soundness of Software Ethology: When semantic equiv-
alence is determined between two functions, that equivalence
is only extended as far as the IOVecs tested along the decision
tree path. It is possible that Software Ethology establishes an
incorrect semantic equivalence between a previously analyzed
function f, and a new unseen function g, if 1) g accepts all
of f’s IOVecs, plus additional IOVecs; and 2) any additionally
accepted IOVec is not along the path to f in the decision
tree. This means that Software Ethology is not a sound
technique. However, as our equivalence class distributions
results show, in practice Software Ethology is accurate for
most functions, even when functions are similar, as with
strcpy and strncpy. In real world code, most functions
have little overlapping functionality, which makes Software
Ethology a practical tool for semantic identification. We have it
as future work to incorporate code coverage into the semantic
similarity analysis, which could produce correct classifications
through the enforcement of a coverage policy as a condition
for semantic equivalence.
Unknown Functions: If a function is encountered that
accepts no known DCIS, Software Ethology will mark this
function as unknown. When a function is marked as unknown,
it can mean one of two things depending on the number of
accepted IOVecs. If the unknown function never accepts an
IOVec, then it implements wholly unknown functionality, and
should be a main focus for analysts. Otherwise, if the function
accepts some IOVecs, then it shares some functionality with
the functions whose DCIS includes the accepted IOVecs. The
utility analysts might gain from this information varies with
the number of IOVecs accepted. Many IOVecs rejected with
a few IOVec acceptances is likely a common failure mode
present in many functions, e.g., returning −1 on invalid input.
If many IOVecs in a DCIS are accepted, then the unknown
function is likely similar to the corresponding function, indi-
cating, e.g., a different version.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Similarity analysis is an active area of research [53]–
[62]. Jiang et al. [10] first proposed using randomized test-
ing in function similarity analysis, drawing inspiration from
polynomial identity testing. Their system, which requires
source, finds syntactically different yet semantically similar
code fragments in large (100+ MLOC) code bases. Software
Ethology does not require source, which, since source is
often unavailable when reverse engineering binaries, makes
Tinbergen a more practical choice.
Current state-of-the-art binary analysis tools all rely on code
measurements. BLEX [13] extracts feature vectors of function
code, such as values read and written to the stack and heap,
by guaranteeing that every instruction is executed. The authors
also implemented a search engine with their system similar to
Tinbergen. Wang, et al. [15] perform code similarity analysis
using a system called IMF-SIM. IMF-SIM uses an in-memory
fuzzer to measure the same metrics as BLEX, instead of
forcing execution to start at unexecuted instructions. As stated
in our evaluation, these works still struggle with differing
compilation environments, while Tinbergen has consistently
high accuracy irrespective of compilation environment. Both
works focus on measuring code properties, which change
with different compilation environments. Software Ethology,
in contrast, uses IOVecs, which are independent of code, and
encodes differing semantics in a binary decision tree.
Pewny, et al. [20] compute a signature of a bug, and search
for that signature in other (possibly different ISA) binaries.
The signature involves computing inputs and corresponding
outputs to basic blocks in functions’ CFGs through dynamic
instrumentation similar to Tinbergen. While the authors admit
that semantic function identification is not their expected use
case, their system can be used as such by supplying a function
as the “bug.” This work, however, heavily relies on the
structure of the CFGs of both the application’s functions and
the code being searched for, which can significantly change
with software version or obfuscation. Software Ethology is
resilient to such differences as long as the function’s semantics
remain the same. Unfortunately, we were also unable to obtain
the source code or detailed results for comparison.
DyCLINK [63] use dynamic analysis to compute a de-
pendency graph between instructions executed during devel-
oper supplied unit tests. Code similarity is determined by
computing an isomorphism between sub graphs, using edit
distance between PageRank [64] vectors. DyCLINK targets
Java applications, and thus, we cannot compare Tinbergen
against it. DyCLINK considers methods as similar if they
share any sufficiently similar behavior for a given input, an
event much more prevalent in C binaries than Java binaries.
Many dissimilar C functions behave similarly when handling
errors (i.e., returning −1 on invalid input), while Java often
favors raising different exceptions based on the specific error
condition. We, therefore, believe that the common error han-
dling technique in C would significantly affect DyCLINK’s
precision. Tinbergen is able to distinguish between functions
with similar functionality, because the decision tree, which
encodes semantic similarity, is generated using differences in
behavior.
Recently, neural networks have been used in binary analysis.
Zuo et al. [65], trained a neural network to determine cross-
architecture semantics of basic blocks. Liu et al. [19], employ
a deep neural network to extract features from functions and
the binary call graph. These features are then used to create a
distance metric for determining binary similarity. Xu et al. [66]
use a neural network to compute the embedding of a function’s
CFG to accelerate similarity computation. These approaches
show promise in improving computer security by utilizing
research from other research areas.
IX. CONCLUSION
We introduce Software Ethology, a binary analysis frame-
work that is architecture and compilation environment agnos-
tic. Instead of measuring code properties, Software Ethology
abstracts functions into sets of input and output program states,
information guaranteed to be stable across compilation en-
vironments. Our proof-of-concept implementation, Tinbergen,
has a high .779 accuracy when identifying functions in binaries
generated from various configurations, remains highly accurate
even against purposefully obfuscated code, and can generalize
to other architectures with minimal effort. We also show that
the Tinbergen can readily scale to large binaries. We will
release Tinbergen as open source upon acceptance.
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